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1Strategic Exploitation of a Common-Property
Resource under Uncertainty
Abstract
We study the impact of uncertainty on the strategies and dynamics of symmetric non-
cooperative games among players who exploit a non-excludable resource that reproduces
under uncertainty. We focus on a particular class of games that deliver a unique Nash equi-
librium in linear-symmetric strategies of resource exploitation. We show that, for this class
of games, the tragedy of the commons is always present. For various changes in the riskiness
of the random primitives of the model we provide general characterizations of features of the
model that explain links between the degree of riskiness and strategic exploitation decisions.
Finally, we provide a speciﬁc example that demonstrates the usefulness of our general results
and, within the speciﬁc example, we study cases where increases in risk amplify or mitigate
the tragedy of the commons.
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21. Introduction
Games of common-property renewable resource exploitation have the feature that each player
chooses their current level of exploitation while (partly) controlling the future evolution of the
resource, given the strategies of other players. Models in which there is a dynamic element
and in which resources are shared, play an important role in economics, e.g., industrial
organization models or models with natural resources. The fundamental, inﬁnite-horizon
setup, where all players have full information about the economic environment, has been
studied in the economics literature almost exclusively within the deterministic framework.
The main ﬁnding of this literature is that the equilibrium is characterized by a ‘tragedy of the
commons.’ Namely, the higher the number of players, the higher the aggregate exploitation
rate, so the resource shrinks to a lower level in the long run.1
The tragedy of the commons results after a complex strategic accounting by players in
a perfect-foresight environment. In particular, it is transparent to each player that over-
exploitation implies future trajectories of the common resource that increase their present
and future individual costs. Yet, given what other players do, and what they will be doing
throughout the inﬁnite horizon, it is often individually optimal to support a strategic path
of aggregate overexploitation of the resource, when the number of players increases. How
does such a strategic behavior change if, instead of acting in a deterministic environment,
players act in an environment of uncertainty and rational expectations? Our study con-
tributes some answers to this general question, focusing on inﬁnite-horizon games where the
law of reproduction of the resource is subject to random shocks and players have rational
expectations.2
1 See, for example, Mirman (1979) and Levhari and Mirman (1980), Levhari, Michener and Mirman (1981),
Benhabib and Radner (1992), Dockner and Sorger (1996), Sorger (1998, 2005) and Koulovatianos and
Mirman (2007).
2 Our focus on randomness in resource reproduction is a natural starting point for the study of uncertainty in
1The scope and aim of our analysis is to contribute to the understanding of the mechanics
of common-property resource games under uncertainty. Yet, stochastic dynamic games can
be particularly complex and very diﬃcult to characterize with general primitives, i.e. with
general payoﬀ functions of players, general resource or renewal laws of motion and general
distributions of random disturbances.3 A tt h es a m et i m e ,t h et a s ko fc h a r a c t e r i z i n gd e c i s i o n s
in the presence of uncertainty in a general framework can be very demanding even when there
is only one player.4 We ﬁrst discuss several technical problems that arise in general dynamic
games. In particular, in resource games, a part of the objective function of each player is the
other players’ strategies. When the Markov strategies of other players are strictly concave,
a player’s objective function may lose key properties, such as concavity, diﬀerentiability, or
continuity. These technical diﬃculties, discussed by Mirman (1979), justify our focus on a
class of games with a unique Nash solution in linear-symmetric Markov strategies.5 Our
paper is devoted to the study of this tractable class of games, a natural starting point for
understanding players’ strategicb e h a v i o ru n d e ru n c e r t a i n t y .
We deal with two basic issues concerning all models in the class of dynamic games with
a unique Nash solution in linear-symmetric Markov strategies. The ﬁrst is whether the
resource games. In the real world, resources evolve according to stochastic laws of motion. Especially when
in the context of natural resources, as is the case with biological populations such as forests and ﬁsh species,
these evolve subject to the existence of predators or climate, that are aﬀected by random disturbances.
In cases of governmental provisions of infrastructure for companies, such as railroads, electricity grids,
telecommunication networks, etc., ﬁnancing and maintenance is also subject to random shocks, such as
business cycles or political cycles.
3 An example of a study examining the link between extraction decisions and uncertain reproduction out-
comes under perfect competition, and also optimal resource preservation policies is the ﬁshery application
of Mirman and Spulber (1985). For a paper studying uncertainty and games see Amir (1996). For studies
pointing out technical issues in deterministic diﬀerential resource games, such as multiplicity of equilibrium
strategies, arising even in setups with some simplifying assumptions on primitives, see Dockner and Sorger
(1996), and Sorger (1998), while for fundamental proofs of equilibrium existence see Sundaram (1989) and
Dutta and Sundaram (1992).
4 For example, Mirman (1971) analyzes uncertainty in a model with a single controller, providing a general
result about the role of uncertainty on decisions in two-period models, and discussing issues arizing in the
inﬁnite-horizon setup.
5 A game that falls in this class is the parametric example of Levhari and Mirman (1980).
2tragedy of the commons holds in this class of games. Secondly, we study the eﬀect of the
riskiness of the random primitives of the model on the players’ strategies. In particular, we
highlight those features of the model that explain the links between the degree of riskiness
and strategic exploitation decisions. We then provide a parametric example within the class
of games with linear strategies, that extends (and also nests) the Levhari-Mirman (1980)
example. Apart from demonstrating the applicability of our general results concerning games
with linear strategies, this example allows us to study whether the degree of riskiness can
amplify or mitigate the tragedy of the commons.
Our ﬁrst result is that all games, stochastic or deterministic, that have a unique Nash
equilibrium in linear-symmetric Markov strategies, always imply a tragedy of the commons.
This means, in this class of games, adding one more player always leads to a higher aggregate
exploitation rate in a symmetric equilibrium.
T h en e x tr e s u l ti sa b o u tt h ea p p l i c a b i l i t yo farecursive procedure for calculating linear-
symmetric strategies. Levhari and Mirman (1980) used a method for solving dynamic games
that started from the one-period problem and continued recursively for the n-period problem,
in order to obtain the inﬁnite-horizon solution asymptotically. We ﬁnd that for the class of
games that lead to linear symmetric strategies the calculation method used by Levhari and
Mirman (1980) always converges to the inﬁnite-period solution, as long as linear-symmetric
solutions for the n-period problem exist.6
Next we examine the link between the degree of riskiness and strategic decisions. For
games with the same payoﬀ functions and the same natural law of resource reproduction,
we examine how diﬀerent shocks that are linked through the concepts of second- or ﬁrst-
order stochastic dominance aﬀect strategies. Second-order stochastic dominance implies an
6 The standard Inada condition on the payoﬀ (utility) functions and a simple condition on the distribution
function of the random production shock are suﬃcient to guarantee the existence of solutions to the associated
n-period problem.
3increase in riskiness, whereas ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance implies a change in the mean
of the shock. In all cases we identify simple conditions on the payoﬀ function of players that
explain the direction of the change in exploitation rates as the stochastic structure of the
shocks changes.
We then study speciﬁc parametric models in order to show the usefulness of our results
about games with linear symmetric strategies. In particular, we show that the Levhari-
Mirman (1980) model is a knife-edge case where the presence of uncertainty has no impact
on the strategies. So, we present an extended example that nests the Levhari-Mirman
(1980) model and provides a unique Nash equilibrium in linear-symmetric strategies in which
uncertainty plays a crucial role. This example is a key contribution of this paper, indicating a
new benchmark for initiating interesting questions about uncertainty in games. One question
that becomes easy to analyze with this example, is to look at the eﬀect of changes in risk on
the intensity of the ‘tragedy of the commons.’ In the context of our example, we show that,
indeed, there are cases where the ‘tragedy of the commons’ is mitigated, and cases where it
is ampliﬁed, as the random parameter becomes more risky.
In Section 2 we describe the general framework of resource exploitation games and point
out the technical diﬃculties that arise for nonlinear strategies. In Section 3 we provide results
for general games with a unique Nash equilibrium in linear-symmetric Markovian strategies.
We devote Section 4 to showing that the Levhari-Mirman (1980) model is a knife-edge case
where the presence of uncertainty does not inﬂuence the players’ strategies. In Section 5, we
provide our analysis of our extended parametric model.
42. The general framework
Time is discrete and the horizon is inﬁnite, i.e. t =0 ,1,.... Let the state variable, x,e v o l v e
naturally (when no consumption occurs) according to the law of motion,
xt+1 = θtf (xt) .( 1 )
Here f  > 0, f   ≤ 0. The random variable θt is i.i.d., independent of xt and,
θt ∼ Θ(θt) , t =0 ,1,... .
Here Θ is the distribution function of θt,f o ra l lt,w i t hs u p p o r tSθ ⊆ R+ and E (θt) < ∞.
We consider N ≥ 1 identical players. In period t,e a c hp l a y e rj ∈{ 1,...,N} consumes
cj,t ≥ 0 units of the available stock, and then a realization of the random shock takes place.



















Here u : R+ → R is twice continuously diﬀerentiable with u  > 0, u   < 0. All players have
the same lifetime utility.7 Moreover, δ ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor.
We study a Markov-Nash equilibrium, i.e. an equilibrium with strategies of the form
{ci = Ci (x)}
N
i=1. The problem of player j ∈{ 1,...,N} in Bellman equation form is,
































7 Throughout the paper the functions u and f are assumed to have the properties: u  > 0, u   < 0, f  > 0
and f   ≤ 0.
5We suppose, for the moment, that the value function is twice continuously diﬀerentiable.8
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⎦ .( 5 )
A signiﬁcant technical diﬃculty follows from (5). While u(·) is strictly concave, the strategies
Ci (·) of the other players need not be convex, so the value function Vj (·) need not be concave.
In fact, Mirman (1979, pp. 65-72) provides several examples of games using functions u and
f, which meet our general assumptions, but lead to value ‘functions’ that are not concave,
not diﬀerentiable, or even not continuous, in fact, they may be correspondences. What is
intriguing about the examples in Mirman (1979, pp. 65-72) is that, if the functions u and f
were used in a single-controller optimization problem, all the resulting value functions would
be twice continuously diﬀerentiable and strictly concave.
3. Games with a unique Nash equilibrium in linear-symmetric
Markovian strategies
The diﬃculty with the nonconcavity of the value function in games with ‘standard’ primitives
u and f, suggest an attack on the problem. We investigate problems that deliver a unique
8 This is not a valid assumption for the general problem, as we discuss below.
6Markov Nash equilibrium in linear strategies, i.e. problems where C 
i (x)=ω,f o ra l li ∈
{1,...,N}, or unique symmetric linear strategies of the form,
Ci (x)=ωx , i ∈{ 1,...,N} ,w i t hω ∈ (0,1/N) .( 6 )
For games, u, f and Θ, for which a unique strategy of the form in (6) exists, condition (5)
becomes,
V
  (x)=[ 1− (N − 1)ω]u
  (ωx) .( 7 )
Under these assumptions, V   > 0,w h i l eV    exists and is strictly negative. In other words, a
Nash equilibrium with linear symmetric strategies ensures that V is twice continuously dif-
ferentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave. Notice that, since we focus on symmetric
strategies, the index j is dropped from the value function.
One example of a model with a unique, linear-symmetric, strategy is the model of Lev-
hari and Mirman (1980), where u(c)=l n( c), f (x)=xα,a n dα ∈ (0,1).9 In this study, we
present an extended pair of functions u and f that nests the Levhari-Mirman (1980) exam-
ple.10 Since models that deliver unique, linear-symmetric, Markov strategies are identiﬁed,
we proceed with a general analysis for this class of models. We focus on two issues: (a)
the strategic behavior of players, in particular, the “tragedy of the commons,” and (b) the
eﬀect of uncertainty, or increases in risk, on consumption strategies. We study the eﬀects of
“increasing risk” using the concepts of ﬁrst- and second order stochastic dominance.
In order to achieve our second goal, we compare decisions made in the stochastic model
with decisions made in a version of the deterministic model in which the shock θ is always
equal to its mean, E (θ)=¯ θ.11 In the deterministic model, player j’s problem, given the
9 Levhari and Mirman (1980) also examine cases of non-symmetric strategies by allowing the discount factors
of players to diﬀer.
10This pair of u and f is presented in Section 5. We prove that the linear-strategy symmetric equilibrium
in the extended example is unique. This, implies that the linear-strategy symmetric equilibrium in the
Levhari-Mirman model (1980) is unique as well.
11See Hahn (1970), Stiglitz (1970) and Mirman (1971).
7strategies of all other players is,























⎦ .( 8 )
We distinguish between the stochastic model carrying the subscript “s,” and the determin-
istic model with subscript “d, ”a n dw ef o r m a l l yd e ﬁ n et h es e t so fs t r a t e g i e sw ea r ef o c u s i n g
on.






i=1 | Cs,i (x)=Cs (x)=ωsx , i =1 ,...,N,w i t hωs ∈ (0,1/N),
for all x>0, where Cs(x) solves problem (2) for all j ∈{ 1,...,N},
and Ci (x)=Cs (x) for all i ∈{ 1,...,N} with i  =j
 
,





i=1 | Cd,i (x)=Cd (x)=ωdx , i =1 ,...,N,w i t hωd ∈ (0,1/N),
for all x>0, where Cd (x) solves problem (8) for all j ∈{ 1,...,N},
and Ci (x)=Cd (x) for all i ∈{ 1,...,N} with i  =j
 
,
for the deterministic model.
Our analysis pertains to games where the triple  u,f,Θ , implies unique, linear-symmetric,
strategies for both the deterministic and the stochastic game, i.e., that the sets Ss and Sd
are both singletons.13
12Since players are identical and we focus on state-dependent (Markov) strategies, it suﬃces to denote a
game only by  u,f,Θ  for simplicity.
13Amir (1996) shows that, for some games, an equilibrium does not exist in the deterministic case, while
there is at least one equilibrium for the stochastic version of the same model. In our extended example,
presented in Section 5, linear symmetric strategies in both the deterministic and in the stochastic case exist
and are unique.




  ((1 − Nω)x)E [θV
 
s (θf ((1 − Nω)x))] = 0 ,( 9 )
in the stochastic case.14 The necessary condition from (8) implies
ψd (ω)=−u
  (ωx)+δ¯ θf
  ((1 − Nω)x)V
 
d
 ¯ θf ((1 − Nω)x)
 
=0,( 1 0 )
for the deterministic case. Notice that
ψ
 
s (ω) > 0 and ψ
 






,( 1 1 )
so there can be at most one solution in each case.15 A solution exists in both cases, i.e.,
there exist unique ωs and ωd such that
ψs (ωs)=ψd (ωd)=0.( 1 2 )
3.1 The tragedy of the commons
Theorem 1 demonstrates a global result about the strategic behavior of players. We show
that for all games with unique linear symmetric strategies the tragedy of the commons always
holds.
Theorem 1 For any game such that Ss and Sd are both singletons, as the
number of players, N, increases, the aggregate exploitation rates, Ωs ≡ Nωs and
Ωd ≡ Nωd increase.
14Notice that since (9) must be met for all x>0 in the case of linear-symmetric strategies, the function
ψs (·) does not depend on x in equilibrium (i.e., when ω = ωs). Even if the left-hand side of (9) depends on
x whenever (9) is not met with equality (i.e., when ω  = ωs), this potential dependence on x does not aﬀect
our analysis, so we discard x for the sake of simplicity.
15A suﬃcient condition for the existence of one solution is the Inada condition limc→0 u  (c)=∞ on the
utility function.
9Proof
For any x>0, a player’s necessary condition is,
ψs (ω)=−u
  (ωx)+δf
  ((1 − Nω)x)E [θV
 
s (θf ((1 − Nω)x))] = 0 .
We can express the ﬁrst order condition as a function of the aggregate exploitation rate











hs (Ω) = δf
  ((1 − Ω)x)E [θV
 
s (θf ((1 − Ω)x))] .
Given that V   
s < 0,a n df   ≤ 0, h 

























N2 > 0 ,( 1 3 )
which proves the result. The argument for the deterministic case is the same.
Our result is sharp for the class of games that we examine. Nevertheless, Theorem 1 is
an indication that the ‘tragedy of the commons’ is robust for games of joint exploitation.16
3.2 Uncertainty
3.2.1 A general characterization
We analyze the relationship between risk and strategic behavior by comparing outcomes of a
stochastic game to outcomes of its deterministic analogue. Theorem 2 is similar to Theorem
2 in Mirman (1971), adjusted to accommodate a symmetric equilibrium in linear strategies.
16Other studies that examine the issue of the tragedy of the commons include Dutta and Sundaram (1993),
Sorger (1998, 2005), and Dockner and Sorger (1996).
10Theorem 2 For any game  u,f,Θ  such that Ss and Sd are both singletons,





Λs (z) ≡ zV
 
s (z) , Λd (z) ≡ zV
 
d (z) and ρd ≡ f ((1 − Nωd)x) ,
for all x>0.
Proof
Fix x>0. Given that, by assumption, both the deterministic and the stochastic strate-
gies are interior (ωs,ωd ∈ (0, 1/N)), then ψd (ωd)=ψs(ωs)=0 .Y e t ,
ωs  ωd ⇐⇒ ψs (ωd)  0 ⇐⇒ ψs (ωd)  ψd (ωd) ,( 1 5 )
since ψs is strictly increasing on (0, 1/N) (see (11)). Moreover, from (9),
ψs (ωd)=−u
  (ωdx)+δ
f  ((1 − Nωd)x)
f ((1 − Nωd)x)
E [θf ((1 − Nωd)x)V
 




f  ((1 − Nωd)x)
ρd









.( 1 7 )
Combining (16) and (17) with (15), the relationship given by (14) is proved for all x>0.
From Theorem 2 the general features of the value functions, of both the stochastic and
the deterministic problems, emerge that are both necessary and suﬃcient for explaining
the direction of the impact of uncertainty on consumption. However, the characteristics of
11value functions must be speciﬁed in order to make use of Theorem 2. Yet, within the class
of models that deliver unique linear strategies, explicit value functions are easily derived,
making Theorem 2 the key to deriving our results.17 Nevertheless, as the two value functions,
Vs and Vd, generally diﬀer, Theorem 2 does not provide a handy linkup between the primitives
of a game and strategic behavior under risk. To ﬁnd that link, notice that from (7)
V
 
s (x)=[ 1− (N − 1)ωs]u




d (x)=[ 1− (N − 1)ωd]u
  (ωdx) .( 1 9 )
So,
E [Λs (θρd)] = [1 − (N − 1)ωs]f
  ((1 − Nωd)x)E [θu





=[ 1− (N − 1)ωd]f
  ((1 − Nωd)x)¯ θu
   
ωdf ((1 − Nωd)x)¯ θ
 
.( 2 1 )
In other words, the connection between the primitives of the game,  u,f,Θ  and the value
function can be determined in games with linear strategies. This connection, between the
value functions and the primitives of the model proves useful in identifying the role of
the model’s primitives in the mechanics behind the eﬀects of uncertainty on the players’
strategies. Our proofs rely upon the existence of a well-behaved recursive mapping for
calculating the equilibrium. In particular, this calculation procedure is the solution technique
suggested by Levhari and Mirman (1980). We next present some key results about this
procedure.
17In our parametric examples in Section 5, we provide explicit formulas for the value functions. The necessity
part of Theorem 2 proves useful in characterizing parameter choices that lead to the eﬀect of uncertainty on
strategies.
123.2.2 The Levhari-Mirman (1980) recursive procedure
Levhari and Mirman (1980) start from the static symmetric equilibrium, where the con-
sumption rates of players are equal to 1/N. They use this strategy in order to form the
value function and then they continue with the two-period problem, calculate the symmetric
strategies again, generalizing the process to the n-period problem. In general, if a linear sym-
metric strategy exists for the n-period problem, then a tractable recursive mapping on the
consumption rates ω(n) can be constructed, where ω(n) denotes the symmetric-equilibrium
consumption strategy of the n-period problem. Characterizing the evolution of ω(n),a sn
increases, is suﬃcient to characterize the evolution of the symmetric consumption functions
in our class of models.
For n =2 ,3,...,t h en-period problem of a player j ∈{ 1,...,N} is
V
(n)



































,( 2 2 )




s,j are the n-a n d(n − 1)-period value functions
of player j,a n dC
(n)
s,i is the n-period strategy of player i. Similarly, in the deterministic case,
for n =2 ,3,...,t h en-period problem of a player j ∈{ 1,...,N} is
V
(n)



























⎦ .( 2 3 )
Again, we focus on linear-symmetric Markov-Nash strategies.
Deﬁnition 2 For any game,  u,f,Θ , the set of interior linear symmetric
















s x , i =1 ,...,N,w i t hω
(n)
s ∈ (0,1/N),
13for all x>0,w h e r eC
(n)





s (x) for all i ∈{ 1,...,N} with i  =j
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d x , i =1 ,...,N,w i t hω
(n)
d ∈ (0,1/N),
for all x>0, where C
(n)





d (x) for all i ∈{ 1,...,N} with i  =j
 
,
for the deterministic model.




d , n =1 ,2,..., are all singletons.
In this class of games, for any given ω(n), the necessary condition of the (n +1 ) -period














































where Ci (x) is the strategy of a player i  = j.18 So, if linear symmetric equilibrium strategies,
ω
(n+1)











=0,( 2 4 )
18This necessary condition is derived from (22) following the same steps as in the inﬁnite-horizon case, i.e.,
after applying the envelope theorem on (22).
19As above, with function ψs (·), (24) must be met for all x>0 in the case of linear-symmetric strategies, so









, n =1 ,2,...). Even if the expression given by (25) depends on x whenever (24) is not met






, with ω  = ω
(n+1)
s , n =1 ,2,...), this

















  ((1 − Nω)x)E
 
θu
   
ω
(n)
s θf ((1 − Nω)x)
  
.( 2 5 )



































s , the solution to (24) exists, and lies in the open interval (0,1/N),a f t e r

































.( 2 6 )




































d ¯ θf ((1 − Nω)x)
 
.( 2 8 )
The two conditions, (24) and (27) deﬁne two recursive mappings.
Deﬁnition 3 The mapping Ms :[ 0 ,1/N] → [0,1/N] is given by Ψs (Ms (ω),ω)=
0.T h em a p p i n gMd :[ 0 ,1/N] → [0,1/N] is given by Ψd (Md (ω),ω)=0 .
15The following results provide a characterization for these two mappings. In particular,
L e m m a1s h o w st h ei m p o r t a n c eo fi m p o s i n ga nI n a d ac o n d i t i o no nt h eu t i l i t yf u n c t i o nf o r
obtaining interior solutions (this Inada condition is a suﬃcient condition).
Lemma 1 If lim
c→0 u  (c)=∞,f o ra l lω
(1)
s ∈ (0, 1/N] and all ω
(1)
























d ∈ (0, 1/N), n =2 ,3,....
Proof
See Appendix A1.
Lemma 1 leads to a proof of the following result.




d =1 /N, Ms and Md are
convergent, i.e., limn→∞ ω
(n)





Theorem 3 shows that the procedure that Levhari and Mirman (1980) suggested and im-
plemented in their example, leads to recursive computability of the inﬁnite-horizon strategies
for a more general class of games, i.e., the class of games  u,f,Θ  with limc→0 u  (c)=∞,




d , n =1 ,2,..., are all singletons. While this result is interesting
in its own right (as we have identiﬁed a reliable calculation procedure), some properties of
the mappings Ms and Md are useful in the analysis of uncertainty. Lemma 2 states these
properties of Ms and Md.
Lemma 2 If limc→0 u  (c)=∞, then for any interval s =[ˇ ωs, ˆ ωs] ⊆ (0, 1/N],
Ms (ˇ ωs) ≥ ˇ ωs and Ms (ˆ ωs) ≤ ˆ ωs ⇒ ωs ∈ s ,





s = ωs for all ω
(1)
s ∈ s .
Moreover, for any interval d =[ˇ ωd, ˆ ωd] ⊆ (0, 1/N],
Md (ˇ ωd) ≥ ˇ ωd and Md (ˆ ωd) ≤ ˆ ωd ⇒ ωd ∈ d ,





d = ωd for all ω
(1)
s ∈ d .
Proof
See Appendix A1.
Lemma 2 is crucial for the comparisons that follow. Speciﬁcally, in comparing two distinct
models (e.g. the stochastic and the deterministic, or two models with diﬀerent stochastic
structures), we can view the solution to one model as a starting point for calculating the
solution to the other model. If this starting point drives the necessary condition of the
second model to be positive or negative, then we can identify the direction in which the
strategy must be updated. The results, stated by Lemma 2, yield a method for identifying
where the ﬁxed point (inﬁnite-horizon equilibrium) of the second model lies.
3.2.3 Uncertainty and strategic decisions
W i t hL e m m a2 ,w ea r ea b l et oi d e n t i f yt h ep r i m i t i v ef e a t u r e so ft h em o d e lt h a ta r er e s p o n -
s i b l ef o rt h ei m p a c to fu n c e r t a inty on strategies. For games  u,f,Θ  with linear symmetric
Markov-Nash strategies, we show that the result of Theorem 2 hinges on features of the
utility function, u,a l o n e ,a n dn o to nf. Of course, f plays an implicit role, since features
17of both f and u interact for the model to have linear strategies. Nevertheless, our results
identify simple conditions on u that lead to speciﬁc eﬀects of uncertainty on strategies.
Apart from analyzing the comparison between the stochastic and the deterministic game,
(i) we employ the concept of second-order stochastic dominance of the distribution of the
shock in order to ‘increase risk’, and, (ii) we alter the stochastic structure by using ﬁrst-order
stochastically dominated shocks. We ﬁnd that, in games  u,f,Θ  with linear-symmetric
strategies, only the structure of the utility function is needed to explain the impact of
changing risk on strategies. In particular, in the case of ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance, it
is the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion that is responsible for the eﬀect of changes in risk
on strategies.
Before proceeding, for a given pair u and f, we declare the set of distribution functions
of the shock, Θ, which guarantee that the optimization problem of all players is well-deﬁned
and that linear symmetric Markovian strategies exist.20









n=1 ,2,...,a r ea l ln o n - e m p t y .
 
.
Comparison of a stochastic game with its deterministic analogue





d , n =1 ,2,...,o ft h eg a m e u,f,Θ  being all singletons, (i)
20Whether a player’s optimization problem is well-deﬁned in a stochastic Markovian game can depend on
the nature of the shock. For example, if the support of the shock is unbounded, conditions must be placed
on the distribution of the shock in order to guarantee that value functions of players exist. In the context of
the general single-controller stochastic growth model (which is the same as the model of Brock and Mirman
(1972)), Stachurski (2002) identiﬁes a simple condition on the mean of some monotonic transformation of the
random shock that is suﬃcient to guarantee a well-behaved optimization problem and a well-deﬁned long-run
stationary distribution. Unlike Stachurski (2002), we do not provide such a condition for the general game,
but we do so in the context of our more speciﬁc analysis in Section 5.
18ωs <ω d,i fa n do n l yi fλ(z) is strictly convex, (ii) ωs >ω d,i fa n do n l yi fλ(z) is
strictly concave, and (iii) ωs = ωd, if and only if λ(z) is aﬃne, where
λ(z)=zu
  (z) .( 2 9 )
Proof
See Appendix A2.
Theorem 4 implies that, for the class of games with linear symmetric strategies, the
model’s characteristics behind the result of Theorem 2 are given solely by a condition that
pertains to the utility function, u. This does not mean that f does not play any role in the
linkup between uncertainty and strategic behavior. Together with u, the function f is crucial
f o rp l a c i n gag a m e u,f,Θ  in the class of games with linear strategies. The implication of
Theorem 4 is that, in this class of games, the eﬀect of uncertainty on strategic behavior is
determined by a condition on the utility function. Moreover, notice that Theorem 4 does
not require that u(·) be thrice continuously diﬀerentiable.21
We provide two additional characterizations based on comparisons of games using the
notions of second- and ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance.
Comparison of two stochastic games with the same u and f, where one shock





, that have linear strategies, ωs and ˜ ωs,w i t hs h o c k sd e n o t e db yθ ∼ Θ(θ) and




, and such that one shock is riskier than the other. Changes in riskiness of shocks
are captured by the concept of second-order stochastic dominance that is given by Deﬁnition
5.
21For a discussion of this point see Mirman (1971, p. 182) in his analysis of a two-period problem.
19Deﬁnition 5 Let two random variables, ˜ X and X,deﬁned on a common proba-
bility space, with both supports being subsets of Z ⊆ R+. Then X second-order
stochastically dominates ˜ X,o r ˜ X  SSD X,i f






for all concave functions h .
Theorem 5 provides conditions that dictate the eﬀect of increasing risk on strategic
decisions.
Theorem 5 Given a pair u and f, limc→0 u  (c)=∞,f o ra l lΘ, ˜ Θ ∈  (u,f),




d , n =1 ,2,..., are all single-




, (i) if λ(z) is strictly convex, then
˜ ωs <ω s, (ii) if λ(z) is strictly concave, then ˜ ωs >ω s, and, (iii) if λ(z) is aﬃne,
then ˜ ωs = ωs.
Proof
See Appendix A2.
Comparison of two stochastic games with the same u and f, where one shock
ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates the other
Deﬁnition 6 Let two random variables, ˜ X and X,i nac o m m o np r o b a b i l i t y
space, with both supports being subsets of Z ⊆ R+. Then X ﬁrst-order stochas-
tically dominates ˜ X,o r ˜ X  FSD X,i f






for all non-decreasing functions h .
20Unlike the case of second-order stochastic dominance, ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance,
encompasses cases where the two shocks have diﬀerent means.22
Theorem 6 G i v e nap a i ru and f, limc→0 u  (c)=∞,f o ra l lΘ, ˜ Θ ∈  (u,f),




d , n =1 ,2,...,a r ea l ls i n g l e -











  (z)  0 for all z>0 ⇔−
zu  (z)
u  (z)
 1 for all z>0 ,
i.e. the suﬃcient condition (30) is tightly linked with the value of the coeﬃcient
of relative risk aversion.
We proceed to examining speciﬁc examples. Through speciﬁc examples we are able to
demonstrate the usefulness of our general results about games with unique linear symmetric
Markov-Nash strategies.
22Moreover, Deﬁnition 6 is equivalent to the following condition (see Lippman and McCall (1981, pp. 215-6,
Theorem 1)).
Let two random variables, ˜ X and X, in a common probability space, with both supports being
subsets of Z ⊆ R, with distribution functions ˜ F and F.W es a yt h a tX ﬁrst-order stochastically
dominates ˜ X,o r ˜ X  FSD X,i f
˜ F (z) ≥ F (z) for all z ∈ Z .
214. The stochastic Levhari-Mirman (1980) model
Using the Levhari-Mirman (1980) functions, namely u(c)=l n( c) and f (x)=xα,t h ev a l u e




ln(x)+bs ,( 3 1 )




ln(x)+bd ,( 3 2 )
where bs and bd are constants. So,
Λs (z)=Λ d (z)=
α
1 − αδ
for all z>0 .
Theorem 2 implies that ωs = ωd.I nf a c t ,
ωs = ωd =
1 − αδ
N (1 − αδ)+αδ
.( 3 3 )
In brief, the presence of uncertainty does not alter the rate of consumption in the Levhari-
Mirman (1980) model. The diﬀerence between the stochastic and the deterministic model
is that in the stochastic case the state variable evolves randomly and approaches a long-run
stationary distribution. Consequently, the payoﬀs of players are also random in each period.
With the aid of Theorem 2 we show that the Levhari-Mirman model is a knife-edge
case. We do this by extending the Levhari-Mirman model to a class of models for which
uncertainty aﬀects strategies and then showing that it is only in the Levhari-Mirman model
that strategies are not aﬀected by the presence of uncertainty, i.e., the Levhari-Mirman
model is a knife edge. This extension to a more general “Great Fish War” model allow us
to study the eﬀect of uncertainty on the strategies in a game with uncertainty. This task is
undertaken below.
225. An extended example


















,( 3 5 )
with η>0, φ ≥ 0 and α ∈ (0,1]. Notice that for η =1 , u(c)=l n( c) and f (x)=φ
1−αxα,i . e .
the Levhari-Mirman model. A similar example, applied to problems of Cournot oligopoly,
has been presented in Koulovatianos and Mirman (2007).23
5.1 Uniqueness of interior inﬁnite-horizon linear-symmetric strate-
gies
As in Stachurski (2002), we identify a single suﬃcient condition on the mean of the distrib-
ution of the transformed random variable, θ
1− 1
η
t , in order that the stochastic equilibrium be
well-deﬁned.










,a n d [E (θ)]
1− 1
η ≡ ¯ ζ<
1
αδ
,( 3 6 )











From the general ﬁrst-order conditions of a game with linear strategies,
u  (ωx)=δ [1 − (N − 1)ω]f  ((1 − Nω)x)E [θu  (ωf ((1 − Nω)x)θ)]
(see (3) and (7)). Using (34) and the CES production function,
x
− 1
















with y ≡ f ((1 − Nω)x). Setting η = γ is the only way to obtain linear strategies with these functions.
The single-controller version of this example with uncertainty (i.e. N =1 ), is similar to this presented by








η − αδζ (1 − Nωs)
 








η − αδζ (1 − Nωd)
 
,( 3 8 )
are the unique linear-symmetric strategies of the inﬁnite-horizon stochastic game
and the deterministic game, respectively.
Proof
It is easy to verify that (37) is equivalent to Ψs(ωs,ω s,x)=0and that (38) is equivalent
to Ψd (ωd,ωd,x)=0 . Apart from showing that ωs and ωd are unique, we also show that the





























+ bd ,( 4 0 )
where bs and bd are constants, it is transparent that if Nωs =Ω s ∈ (0,1) and Nωd =Ω d ∈
(0,1), then the problem of each player is well-deﬁned. To show that Ωs ∈ (0,1), we examine
two cases.
Case 1: η>1





η − αδζ (1 − Ω)
≡ H (Ω) .( 4 1 )
Here,
H (0) = 1 and H (1) = ∞ ,
24while
H









η − αδζ (1 − Ω)
 2 > 0 ,f o r a l l Ω ∈ (0,1) .





Ω ≥ (1 − Ω)
1− 1
η for all Ω ∈ [0,1),w i t h
equality if and only if Ω=0 . So, applying the intermediate-value theorem to (41) shows
that Ωs ∈ (0,1), a unique symmetric equilibrium in linear strategies. This case is depicted
by Figure 1. For Ωd ∈ (0,1) and uniqueness, replace ζ with ¯ ζ in the above argument.
Case 2: η<1








η − αδζ (1 − Ω)
≡ Ξ(Ω) .( 4 2 )
Where Γ(0)=∞ and Ξ(0)=αδζ/(1 − αδζ),a n d
Ξ(Ω)> 0 if Ω ∈
 





Due to (36) this interval is nonempty. Moreover,
Ξ
  (Ω) = αδζ
1






η − αδζ (1 − Ω)
 2 > 0 for all Ω ∈
 




as 0 < (1 − Ω)
1
η −αδζ (1 − Ω) <
 
1




(1 − Ω) for all Ω ∈
 



















< ∞ and Γ  (Ω) < 0 for all Ω ∈
 




,i tf o l l o w s
that Ωs ∈
 




⊂ (0,1), and it is unique. This is also shown by Figure 2. For
Ωd ∈ (0,1) and the uniqueness of it replace ζ with ¯ ζ in the above argument.
For the last case of η =1 , see Section 4 above, to verify that (33) satisﬁes both (37) and
(38), and also that Ωs =Ω d ∈ (0,1).
25Note that Proposition 1 shows that the Levhari-Mirman model is indeed a knife edge
case for η =1in our extended example. According to our analysis in Section 4, in the case
of η =1of the extended example, uncertainty plays no role.24 However, for other values of
η, uncertainty plays a major role .
5.2 Uniqueness of interior ﬁnite-horizon linear-symmetric strate-
gies
Substituting (34) and (35) into the necessary conditions of the ﬁnite-horizon problem given















.( 4 4 )
It is straightforward from (43) and (44) that Ms (ω),M d (ω) ∈ (0,1/N) for all ω ∈ (0,1/N],
implying that all ﬁnite-horizon strategies are interior and unique. Therefore, we can apply
Theorems 4, 5 and 6, to our model.
5.3 Impact of uncertainty on strategies in the example
5.3.1 Application of Theorem 2





























d .( 4 6 )

















so substituting this expression into (45),










d .( 4 7 )














d .( 4 8 )
Proposition 2 identiﬁes the parameters that are behind the comparison given in Theorem 2.
Proposition 2 If u and f are given by (34) and (35), and Θ is such that (36)
is met, then
η  1 ⇔ ωs  ωd .
Proof By applying the implicit function theorem to (41) and (42) and with the aid of
Figures 1 and 2, it follows that




where Z  (z) < 0 for all z ∈ (0,1/(αδ)).S o ,








η ⇔ η  1 ,( 4 9 )
as the relationship between η and 1 determines whether the function λ(z)=z
1− 1
η is concave,
convex or aﬃne (in the present setting, when η =1 , λ(z) is equal to unity for all z>0).
The result follows from Jensen’s inequality.
275.3.2 Application of Theorems 4, 5 and 6
In our example,
λ(c)=u







  (c)  0 ⇔ η  1
λ
   (c)  0 ⇔ η  1
.( 5 0 )
Since u is thrice diﬀerentiable, the concavity of λ can be examined through the sign of its
second derivative. Notice that, (50) illustrates the connection between Theorems 4, 5 and
6 and Theorem 2, as well as, with the result of Proposition 2. Most importantly, it shows
how the properties of u can aﬀect the role of uncertainty on strategies.
5.4 Changes in risk and the intensity of the tragedy of the com-
mons
In this section we investigate whether increasing risk has an impact on the rate at which
aggregate exploitation rates increase with the number of players. This investigation requires
a comparison of aggregate exploitation rates along two dimensions, the number of players and
the degree of riskiness (in the sense of second-order stochastic dominance). In performing
such a comparison, if we employ two random variables, θ and ˜ θ, with a discrete diﬀerence in
the degree of riskiness, the comparison becomes unclear, as the initial aggregate exploitation
rates can also be discretely diﬀerent before increasing the number of players. For this reason,
we must employ a concept of changing risk that allows for marginal increases in riskiness.









.( 5 1 )
The expectation of θ is,
E (θ)=e
µ ,









i.e., the parameter σ has an impact only on the variance of θ and not on its mean (but
the parameter µ h a sa ni m p a c to nb o t ht h em e a na n dt h ev a r i a n c eo fθ). So, any two
distributions given by (51) with diﬀerent values of parameter σ are linked through second-




with parameters (µ, ˜ σ),t h e n˜ σ>σimplies that ˜ θ  SSD θ.
Proposition 3 examines the impact of increases in risk on the intensity of the tragedy of
the commons.
Proposition 3 If u and f are given by (34) and (35), Θ obeys (51) and condition
(36) is met, then, (i) the tragedy of the commons is ampliﬁed by an increase in
riskiness if and only if η<1, (ii) the tragedy of the commons is mitigated by
an increase in riskiness if and only if η>1, (iii) the tragedy of the commons is
unaﬀected by an increase in riskiness if and only if η =1 .
Proof
See Appendix A4.
Proposition 3 shows that, if, η>1, the overexploitation tendency is mitigated as both
riskiness and the number of players increase. Note, however, Theorem 5 states that when
η>1, for a ﬁxed number of players, all players would tend to increase their consumption
rates as uncertainty increases. These results indicate the complex, yet interesting, strategic
behavior in Nash equilibrium outcomes.
296. Appendix A1 - Proofs of Lemma 1, Theorem 3, and Lemma 2
P r o o fo fL e m m a1
Fix any x>0 and any ω
(n)


























  ((1 − Nω)x)E
 
θu
   
ω
(n)












intersects the zero axis within the interval (0,1/N) at least once. Yet, the







solution, ω(n+1) ∈ (0,1/N). The same argument can be used for the deterministic analogue
of the stochastic model.
Proof of Theorem 3
Fix x>0,f o rt h e1-period stochastic game, the only symmetric Nash equilibrium is
ω
(1)
s =1 /N for all players. Using the same argument as in the proof of Lemma 1, there
exists a unique ω
(2)












.( 5 2 )
30To see (52), suppose that, instead, ω
(2)










































=0 .F r o mL e m m a1 ,ω
(1)







that is generated from( 2 4 ) .G i v e nt h a tωs ∈ (0,1/N) is unique, and the mapping






























s ,n =1 ,2,....
So, limn→∞ω
(n)
s = ωs. The same argument holds for the deterministic analogue of the sto-
chastic model.
P r o o fo fL e m m a2
Fix any x>0 and let s =[ ˇ ωs, ˆ ωs] ⊆ (0, 1/N] with Ms (ˇ ωs) ≥ ˇ ωs and Ms (ˆ ωs) ≤ ˆ ωs.


























0 for all x>0, the intermediate value theorem implies that ωs ∈ s,a sωs is, by assumption,
unique. As Ms (ˇ ωs) ≥ ˇ ωs, strict equality holds only if ˇ ωs = ωs.I f Ms (ˇ ωs) > ˇ ωs,t h e n
ˇ ωs <ω s. From Lemma 1, any ω
(1)












s <ω s, n =1 ,2,..., for all ω
(1)
s ∈ [ˇ ωs,ωs).T h u s , Ms is stable for all
ω
(1)




s >ω s, n =1 ,2,...,
for all ω
(1)
s ∈ (ωs, ˆ ωs],s oMs is stable for all ω
(1)
s ∈ (ωs, ˆ ωs]. Finally, for Ms (ˆ ωs) ≤ ˆ ωs,
equality holds only if ˆ ωs = ωs, completing the proof. The same argument can be used for
the deterministic analogue of the stochastic model.
317. Appendix A2 - Proof of Theorems 4 and 5
Proof of Theorem 4
Fix any x>0. Ψs  
ω,ω(n) 
and Ψd  
ω,ω(n) 








1 − (N − 1)ω(n) 
ω(n)
f  ((1 − Nω)x)

















1 − (N − 1)ω(n) 
ω(n)
f  ((1 − Nω)x)








From (53), (54), and Jensen’s inequality,
(a) Ψs 
ω,ω(n) 
> Ψd  
ω,ω(n) 
for all ω,ω(n) ∈ (0,1/N), and for all Θ,i fa n d
only if, λ(·) is strictly convex,
(b) Ψs 
ω,ω(n) 
< Ψd  
ω,ω(n) 
for all ω,ω(n) ∈ (0,1/N),a n df o ra l lΘ,i fa n d
only if, λ(·) is strictly concave,
(c) Ψs  
ω,ω(n) 
=Ψ d  
ω,ω(n) 
for all ω,ω(n) ∈ (0,1/N), and for all Θ,i fa n d
only if, λ(·) is aﬃne.
So, in case (a), Ψd (ωs,ω s) < Ψs (ωs,ωs)=0 ,s oMd (ωs) >ω s.I nt h ep r o o fo fT h e o r e m
3i ti ss h o w nt h a tMd (1/N) < 1/N. Then, by Lemma 2, ωd ∈ (ωs,1/N),w h i c hp r o v e s
statement (i). In case (b), Ψs (ωd,ωd) < Ψd (ωd,ωd)=0 ,s oMs (ωd) >ω d.S i n c eMs(1/N) <
1/N (from the proof of Theorem 3), Lemma 2 implies that ωs ∈ (ωd,1/N),w h i c hp r o v e s
statement (ii). Finally, statement (iii) is straightforward.
32Proof of Theorem 5
Fix any x>0, the necessary conditions, of the two problems, Ψs 
ω,ω(n) 
and ˜ Ψs  
ω,ω(n) 
,








1 − (N − 1)ω(n) 
ω(n)
f  ((1 − Nω)x)

















1 − (N − 1)ω(n) 
ω(n)
f  ((1 − Nω)x)










Using the expressions (55) and (56), and Deﬁnition 5,
(a) if λ(·) is strictly convex, then ˜ Ψs  
ω,ω(n) 
> Ψs  
ω,ω(n) 
for all ω,ω(n) ∈
(0,1/N),
(b) if λ(·) is strictly concave, then ˜ Ψs  
ω,ω(n) 
< Ψs  
ω,ω(n) 
for all ω,ω(n) ∈
(0,1/N),




for all ω,ω(n) ∈ (0,1/N).
So, in case (a), Ψs (˜ ωs, ˜ ωs) < ˜ Ψs (˜ ωs, ˜ ωs)=0 ,s oMs (˜ ωs) > ˜ ωs.I nt h ep r o o fo fT h e o r e m3
it was shown that Ms (1/N) < 1/N.B yL e m m a2 ,ωs ∈ (˜ ωs,1/N), which proves statement
(i) of the Theorem. In case (b), ˜ Ψs(ωs,ωs) < Ψs (ωs,ω s)=0 ,s o ˜ Ms (ωs) >ω s.S i n c e
˜ Ms (1/N) < 1/N (see the proof of Theorem 3), Lemma 2 implies that ˜ ωs ∈ (ωs,1/N),w h i c h
proves statement (ii) of the Theorem. Finally, statement (iii) is straightforward.
338. Appendix A3 - Proof of Theorem 6
Proof of Theorem 6
Integration by parts yields,










˜ Θ(z) − Θ(z)
 
h
  (z)dz ,
for all diﬀerentiable functions h. So, setting h(z)=λ
 
ω(n)zf ((1 − Nω)x)
 
, for any ω(n) ∈
(0,1/N] and any ω ∈ (0,1/N),t h ef a c tt h a t˜ θ  FSD θ implies,
λ
















B a s e do n( 5 7 ) ,( 5 5 ) ,a n d( 5 6 ) ,
(a) λ
  (z) < 0 for all z>0 ⇒ Ψs (˜ ωs, ˜ ωs) < ˜ Ψs (˜ ωs, ˜ ωs)=0 ,
(b) λ
  (z) > 0 for all z>0 ⇒ ˜ Ψs (ωs,ωs) < Ψs (ωs,ω s)=0 ,
(c) λ
  (z)=0for all z>0 ⇒ ˜ Ψs 
ω,ω(n) 
=Ψ s  
ω,ω(n) 
=0for all ω,ω(n) ∈
(0,1/N).
The rest of the proof follows exactly as in Theorem 5.
9. Appendix A4 - Proof of Proposition 3
Proof of Proposition 3
We denote the aggregate exploitation rate as Ω(σ)=Nω(σ). Equation (13) implies









N ηζ (σ)ξ (σ)












ξ (σ) ≡ [1 − (N − 1)ω(σ)] .













η−1  .( 5 9 )





  (σ)ξ (σ)
η−2
 

















we ﬁnd dξ (σ)/dζ (σ), by applying the implicit function theorem to (37). In particular, (37)


















N ηζ (σ)ξ (σ)
η−1 .( 6 2 )
After substituting (62), the expression ξ (σ)+(η − 1)ζ (σ)
ξ (σ)
ζ (σ) on the RHS of (60), becomes,






ξ (σ) − N−1
N ζ (σ)ξ (σ)
η
1 − N−1
N ηζ (σ)ξ (σ)
η−1 .
Yet, (61) implies that, ξ (σ) − N−1
N ζ (σ)ξ (σ)
η = 1
N,s o ,






















η−1 3 .( 6 3 )









N ηζ (σ)ξ (σ)




η−1 > 0 ,
so, (63) implies that,
∂2 ln[Ω(σ)]
∂N∂σ
 0 ⇔ ζ
  (σ)  0 ⇔ η  1 ,
which proves the Proposition.
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